Job Search, Locus of Control, and Internal Migration

44 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2016

See all articles by Marco Caliendo

Marco Caliendo

University of Potsdam; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Deborah A. Cobb-Clark

School of Economics, University of Sydney; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Juliane Hennecke

Free University of Berlin (FUB)

Arne Uhlendorff

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

Internal migration can substantially improve labor market efficiency. Consequently, policy is often targeted towards reducing the barriers workers face in moving to new labor markets. In this paper we explicitly model internal migration as the result of a job search process and demonstrate that assumptions about the timing of job search have fundamental implications for the pattern of internal migration that results. Unlike standard search models, we assume that job seekers do not know the true job offer arrival rate, but instead form subjective beliefs - related to their locus of control - about the impact of their search effort on the probability of receiving a job offer. Those with an internal locus of control are predicted to search more intensively (i.e. across larger geographic areas) because they expect higher returns to their search effort. However, they are predicted to migrate more frequently only if job search occurs before migration. We then test the empirical implications of this model. We find that individuals with an internal locus of control not only express a greater willingness to move, but also undertake internal migration more frequently.

Keywords: locus of control, internal migration, mobility, job search

JEL Classification: J61

Suggested Citation

Caliendo, Marco and Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. and Hennecke, Juliane and Uhlendorff, Arne, Job Search, Locus of Control, and Internal Migration. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9600. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2713021

Marco Caliendo (Contact Author)

University of Potsdam ( email )

August-Bebel Strasse 89
Potsdam, 14482
Germany
+49(0)331/9773225 (Phone)
+49(0)331/9773210 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uni-potsdam.de/en/empwifo/news.html

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Deborah A. Cobb-Clark

School of Economics, University of Sydney ( email )

606 Social Sciences Bldg. (A02)
The University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia
61435061387 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Juliane Hennecke

Free University of Berlin (FUB) ( email )

Boltzmannstra├če 20
Berlin, Berlin 14195
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwiss.fu-berlin.de/en/fachbereich/vwl/schoeb/lehrstuhl/Hennecke/index.html

Arne Uhlendorff

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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