What the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Can Learn from the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation

25 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2001  

Zvi Bodie

Boston University - Department of Finance & Economics

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Abstract

This paper attempts to draw attention to some important lessons that the Pension Benefit Guaranty Coroporation (PBGC) can learn from the experience of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). FSLIC was the government agency that insured deposits at savings and loan associations until it was replaced in 1989 leaving a massive deficit to be financed by taxpayers. Like FSLIC, the PBGC is a government agency that guarantees a form of private corporate debt. As guarantor of the pension benefits promised by private plan sponsors, the PBGC bears the risk of a shortfall between the value of insured benefits and the assets securing those benefits.

The magnitude of the the PBGC's exposure to shortfall risk depends on three factors:

- the financial strength of plan sponsors,

- the degree of underfunding of insured benefits,

- the mismatch between the market-risk exposure of insured benefits and the assets securing them.

Only the first two of these have been addressed by past legistlative reforms. The third factor appears not to be well understood. It is apparently a widespread belief among policymakers that a well-diversified pension portfolio of equity securities provides an effective long-run hedge against liabilities of defined-benefit pension plans, so that there is no mismatch problem. This belief is mistaken. The policy based upon it creates the potential for large shortfall losses to the PBGC. Therein lies an uncomfortable parallel with the S&L debacle of the 1980s.

Keywords: PBGC, pension guarantees

Suggested Citation

Bodie, Zvi, What the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Can Learn from the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1996. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=271328 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.271328

Zvi Bodie (Contact Author)

Boston University - Department of Finance & Economics ( email )

United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.zvibodie.com

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