Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence

69 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2016 Last revised: 22 Mar 2021

See all articles by Sebastian Galiani

Sebastian Galiani

University of Maryland - Department of Economics

Cheryl Long

Colgate University - Economics Department

Camila Navajas Ahumada

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - UC San Diego

Gustavo Torrens

Indiana university

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2016

Abstract

Two types of political conflicts of interest pervade many of the world’s societies. A horizontal conflict of interest arises when different constituencies support different policies, while a vertical conflict of interest emerges when those in charge of running the government acquire and retain rents in the process of doing so. We experimentally explore the connections between the two. We identify two sets of models that incorporate both types of conflicts: electoral models with endogenous rents, and common-agency models. We adapt these models to a laboratory setting and test their main theoretical predictions using two experiments. In both cases we find support for the proposition that more intense horizontal conflict leads to higher rents, which is one of the theoretical predictions of the parametrized electoral and common-agency models that we have used.

Suggested Citation

Galiani, Sebastian and Long, Cheryl Xiaoning and Navajas Ahumada, Camila and Torrens, Gustavo, Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence (January 2016). NBER Working Paper No. w21857, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2713582

Sebastian Galiani (Contact Author)

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States

Cheryl Xiaoning Long

Colgate University - Economics Department ( email )

13 Oak Drive
Hamilton, NY 13346
United States

Camila Navajas Ahumada

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - UC San Diego ( email )

9500 Gilman Dr., 0519
La Jolla, CA 92093-0519
United States

Gustavo Torrens

Indiana university ( email )

Wylie Hall, 100 S Woodland Ave
Bloomington, IN 47405-7104
United States
8128568131 (Phone)
47405-7104 (Fax)

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