Forthcoming, British Journal of Political Science
53 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 2016
Date Written: January 11, 2016
Governments face different incentives when they reorganize many administrative agencies at one time rather than making infrequent, case-by-case changes. Our theory of mass administrative reorganizations posits that their politics is focused on government accountability for policymaking. Viewing mass reorganization as a structured decision, we argue that choices about independence, agency organization, and functional disposition have different impacts on the political costs of administrative policymaking. Analyzing novel data from a recent British reorganization with sequential logistic statistical models provides substantial support for our claims. Our study challenges the focus on organizational survival in the existing literature. By eschewing more fundamental political questions of democratic accountability, the prevailing approach masks essential politics, and in our data, all influence of conflict due to party and agency policy positions.
Keywords: Accountability, Termination, Agency, Reorganization, Termination, British Politics, Public Administration
JEL Classification: H11
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bertelli, Anthony M. and Sinclair, John Andrew, Democratic Accountability and the Politics of Mass Administrative Reorganization (January 11, 2016). Forthcoming, British Journal of Political Science ; NYU Wagner Research Paper No. 2714118. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2714118