Bridging the National Security Accountability Gap: A Three-Part System to Modernize Canada's Inadequate Review of National Security
63 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2016 Last revised: 4 May 2016
Date Written: March 31, 2016
In this paper, we urge that Canada’s reformed national security accountability review structure be built on the model of a three-legged stool: first, a properly resourced and empowered committee of parliamentarians with robust access to secret information, charged primarily with strategic issues, including an emphasis on “efficacy” review; second, a consolidated and enhanced expert review body — a “security and intelligence community reviewer” or “super SIRC” — with all-of-government jurisdiction, capable of raising efficacy issues but charged primarily with “propriety” review; and third, an independent monitor of national security law, built on the UK and Australian model, with robust access to secret information and charged with expert analysis of Canada’s anti terrorism and national security legislation and able to work in concert with the other bodies on specific issues.
This is the second edition of this paper, reflecting comments received on an earlier draft.
Keywords: national security, law, accountability, review, oversight, Canada
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