Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

10 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2016

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Stephen Morris

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 12, 2016

Abstract

A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an "information designer" who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We describe a unifying perspective for information design. We consider a simple example of Bayesian persuasion with both an uninformed and informed receiver. We extend information design to many players and relate it to the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium.

Keywords: Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Information

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83.

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen Edward, Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (January 12, 2016). Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 076_2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2714994 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2714994

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Stephen Edward Morris (Contact Author)

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

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