Reforms and Collective Action in a Clientelist Party System: Greece During the Mitsotakis Administration (1990-1993)

South European Society and Politics, 2014, Volume 19, Issue 2, pp. 215-243

21 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2016

See all articles by Aris Trantidis

Aris Trantidis

University of Lincoln (UK) - School of Social Sciences

Date Written: January 14, 2014

Abstract

Economic reforms face a collective action problem: they trigger the reaction of groups that expect significant losses, while the anticipated gains are often dispersed across the population and too uncertain to animate strong popular support. This pattern may exhibit different characteristics in a clientelist economy where the affected groups are client groups under the protection of political parties. The reform agenda of the Mitsotakis government in Greece (1990-1993) illustrates that the collective action problem affects primarily the internal structure of the clientelist parties and thereby their capacity for political mobilisation. Reforms that depart from the established political equilibrium on economic policy will undermine the internal cohesion of the government party and will offer the opposition party the opportunity to strengthen its own unity and political mobilisation capacity.

Keywords: clientelism, collective action, political parties, labor unions, trade unions, economic reforms, Greece, patronage, Mitsotakis

JEL Classification: P1, P16, P5, P51, P52

Suggested Citation

Trantidis, Aris, Reforms and Collective Action in a Clientelist Party System: Greece During the Mitsotakis Administration (1990-1993) (January 14, 2014). South European Society and Politics, 2014, Volume 19, Issue 2, pp. 215-243, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2715801

Aris Trantidis (Contact Author)

University of Lincoln (UK) - School of Social Sciences ( email )

Lincoln
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
22
Abstract Views
296
PlumX Metrics