Training and Product Quality in Unionized Oligopolies

41 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2016

See all articles by Emanuele Bacchiega

Emanuele Bacchiega

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Antonio Minniti

University of Bologna

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2015

Abstract

In this paper we analyse the private and public incentives towards skill acquisition when the skill level of workers determines the quality level of goods, and both labour and product markets are non‐competitive. We show that both ‘pure’ (set by either firms or unions only) and ‘mixed’ (set by firms and unions) training scenarios may emerge at equilibrium. We show that firms have generally greater training incentives than unions, resulting in a higher product quality. Our welfare analysis shows that both unions and firms underinvest in training in comparison with the social optimum.

Suggested Citation

Bacchiega, Emanuele and Minniti, Antonio, Training and Product Quality in Unionized Oligopolies (December 2015). Economica, Vol. 82, pp. 1261-1301, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2716497 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12148

Emanuele Bacchiega (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
40126 Bologna, 40125
Italy
+390512098486 (Phone)
+390512098493 (Fax)

Antonio Minniti

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40100
Italy

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