When Pressure Sinks Performance: Evidence from Diving Competitions

10 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2016

See all articles by Christos Genakos

Christos Genakos

University of Cambridge, Cambridge Judge Business School; Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Center for Economic Performance (CEP)

Mario Pagliero

University of Turin - Department of Economics; University of Turin - Collegio Carlo Alberto

Eleni Garbi

Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, Students

Date Written: July 1, 2012

Abstract

Tournaments are designed to enhance participants’ effort and productivity. However, ranking near the top may increase psychological pressure and reduce performance. We empirically study the impact of interim rank on performance using data from international diving tournaments. We find that competitors systematically underperform when ranked closer to the top, despite higher incentives to perform well.

Keywords: Tournaments, Incentives, Choking under pressure

JEL Classification: J24, L83, M52, Z13

Suggested Citation

Genakos, Christos and Pagliero, Mario and Garbi, Eleni, When Pressure Sinks Performance: Evidence from Diving Competitions (July 1, 2012). Economics Letters, Vol. 120, No. 4, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2717931 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2717931

Christos Genakos (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge, Cambridge Judge Business School ( email )

Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/faculty-research/faculty-a-z/christos-genakos/

Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Center for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Mario Pagliero

University of Turin - Department of Economics ( email )

Corso Unione Sovietica 218b
10134 Torino
Italy

University of Turin - Collegio Carlo Alberto ( email )

via Real Collegio 30
Moncalieri, Torino 10024
Italy

Eleni Garbi

Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, Students ( email )

Athens
Greece

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