Offshoring and Labour Market Reforms in Germany: Assessment and Policy Implications

Posted: 19 Jan 2016

See all articles by Joël Hellier

Joël Hellier

LEM-CNRS (UMR 9221)

Thomas Beissinger

University of Hohenheim; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Nathalie Chusseau

University of Lille I - EQUIPPE; MESHS-CNRS

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

Starting from the diagnosis that Germany has had better economic outcomes than most advanced countries since the mid-2000s, we propose a general equilibrium model to answer the following two questions: Why is it so and is the German experience applicable to other EU countries? Whereas a large number of observers explain German competitiveness by the labour market reforms implemented from 2003 to 2005 (Hartz laws), we suggest that (i) the gains in competitiveness are essentially due to offshoring and (ii) the labour market reforms have subsequently reduced the offshoring-related unemployment by decreasing the reservation wage, creating thereby low skilled jobs in non-tradable services. These reforms have also reinforced inequality already generated by offshoring. In contrast with the traditional explanation based on the Hartz reforms, our model findings and simulations fit well with the sequence of observed facts. This experience could be extended to other EU countries, but with higher cost and lower efficiency. Finally, as the reduction in unemployment is based on the extension of non-tradable services, we suggest alternative policies that reach the same goal without increasing inequality.

Keywords: Competitiveness, Germany, Labor market policy, Offshoring, Unemployment

JEL Classification: F16, H55, J31, J65

Suggested Citation

Hellier, Joël and Beissinger, Thomas and Chusseau, Nathalie, Offshoring and Labour Market Reforms in Germany: Assessment and Policy Implications (2016). Economic Modelling, Vol. 53, No. Feb., 2016, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2718049

Joël Hellier (Contact Author)

LEM-CNRS (UMR 9221) ( email )

104, avenue du peuple Belge
Villeneuve d'Ascq Cedex, 59655
France

Thomas Beissinger

University of Hohenheim ( email )

Schloss Museumsflügel
Stuttgart, 70593
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://labour.uni-hohenheim.de/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Nathalie Chusseau

University of Lille I - EQUIPPE ( email )

Université Lille 1 Sciences et Technologies
Faculté des Sciences Economiques et Sociales
Villeneuve d'Ascq, 59655
France

MESHS-CNRS ( email )

2 Rue des Canonniers
Lille, 59000
France

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