FRAND in India

Competition Policy and Regulation in India: A Economic Approach; OUP (India) (2016, Forthcoming)

Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1374

University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 16-46

17 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2016 Last revised: 7 Oct 2016

See all articles by Shubha Ghosh

Shubha Ghosh

Syracuse University College of Law

D. Daniel Sokol

University of Florida Levin College of Law

Date Written: April 23, 2016

Abstract

This paper examines FRAND issues in India. From an institutional perspective, India's FRAND cases do not effectively establish the appropriate role for antitrust in FRAND. On the one hand, there is the potential for hold-up and anti-competitive conduct in the FRAND setting. Such situations would be very fact specific but the CCI orders to date use sweeping language and analysis based on per se like rules of illegality. On the other hand, the creation of per se like rules of illegality create the possibility that CCI will act as a price regulator rather than antitrust enforcer. Over time and with greater use of economic analysis (and greater reliance on the economic staff at CCI), CCI may improve its institutional capabilities. However, the role of jurisdiction as between CCI and the judiciary remains unclear. How best to treat FRAND disputes will take time but the hope is that through greater experience and learning by doing, the Indian competition system will set out a set of economically informed principles for sound FRAND enforcement.

On the issue of institutional design and deference, one question that has not yet been reached (and may not for some time) is how the courts should handle deference when CCI has developed the necessary economic skills to undertake complex cases of antitrust and technology. Should the judiciary defer to agency as expert once expertise developed? This is potentially a chicken and egg problem on developing expertise and rules of deference in need of further study. Complicating matters further is that the economics on competition and patents is complex. Creating an administrable economic model that is coherent remains a work in progress.

Overall the Indian FRAND cases suggest that the current mix of Indian institutions may not yet be well suited to address complex issues of antitrust enforcement. Consequently, such cases should be approached cautiously with a mind on how to think through the economics of innovation, and the implications of enforcement on technology, IP and competition to yield optimal results and the right institutional structure for improved enforcement.

Keywords: FRAND, antitrust, competition law, innovation policy, intellectual propery, India

JEL Classification: K21, L41, O34

Suggested Citation

Ghosh, Shubha and Sokol, D. Daniel, FRAND in India (April 23, 2016). Competition Policy and Regulation in India: A Economic Approach; OUP (India) (2016, Forthcoming); Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1374; University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 16-46. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2718256 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2718256

Shubha Ghosh

Syracuse University College of Law ( email )

900 S. Crouse Avenue
Syracuse, NY 13244-2130
United States

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

University of Florida Levin College of Law ( email )

Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol

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