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Reputational Spillovers: Evidence from French Architecture

Strategic Organization, Vol. 13(4) 284-306, 2015

23 Pages Posted: 21 Jan 2016  

Amélie Boutinot

Institut Supérieur de Gestion (ISG), Paris

Shaz Ansari

University of Cambridge - Judge Business School; Erasmus University, Rotterdam (EUR)

Mustapha Belkhouja

Grenoble Ecole de Management

Vincent Mangematin

Grenoble Ecole de Management

Date Written: 2015

Abstract

While the notion of reputation has attracted much scholarly interest, few studies have addressed the strategic issue of reputational multiplicity and managing the interactions among different types of reputations. We suggest that an organization can have several stakeholder-specific reputations — peer, market, and expert — and that reputational spillover effects (the continued influence of one reputation on another) matter at the organizational level. We test reputational spillovers on 42 French architecture companies over a period of 30 years. Our results show that over time, the three reputations interact with each other, generating positive spillovers, with the exception of market and expert reputations. We contribute by explaining how interconnected organizational reputations among different stakeholders can interact over time, how companies can strategically manage reputational spillovers, and how such spillovers influence organizations in creative and professional industries.

Keywords: rchitecture, creative industries, reputation, selection-system theory, spillover effects

Suggested Citation

Boutinot, Amélie and Ansari, Shaz and Belkhouja, Mustapha and Mangematin, Vincent, Reputational Spillovers: Evidence from French Architecture (2015). Strategic Organization, Vol. 13(4) 284-306, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2718697

Amélie Boutinot

Institut Supérieur de Gestion (ISG), Paris ( email )

Paris
France

Shahzad Ansari (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Judge Business School ( email )

Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom

Erasmus University, Rotterdam (EUR) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands

Mustapha Belkhouja

Grenoble Ecole de Management ( email )

12 Rue Pierre Semard
Grenoble, Cedex 01 38000
France

Vincent Mangematin

Grenoble Ecole de Management ( email )

12 Rue Pierre Semard
Grenoble, Cedex 01 38000
France

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