Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2718697
 


 



Reputational Spillovers: Evidence from French Architecture


Amélie Boutinot


Institut Supérieur de Gestion (ISG), Paris

Shaz Ansari


University of Cambridge - Judge Business School; Erasmus University, Rotterdam (EUR)

Mustapha Belkhouja


Grenoble Ecole de Management

Vincent Mangematin


Grenoble Ecole de Management

2015

Strategic Organization, Vol. 13(4) 284-306, 2015

Abstract:     
While the notion of reputation has attracted much scholarly interest, few studies have addressed the strategic issue of reputational multiplicity and managing the interactions among different types of reputations. We suggest that an organization can have several stakeholder-specific reputations — peer, market, and expert — and that reputational spillover effects (the continued influence of one reputation on another) matter at the organizational level. We test reputational spillovers on 42 French architecture companies over a period of 30 years. Our results show that over time, the three reputations interact with each other, generating positive spillovers, with the exception of market and expert reputations. We contribute by explaining how interconnected organizational reputations among different stakeholders can interact over time, how companies can strategically manage reputational spillovers, and how such spillovers influence organizations in creative and professional industries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: rchitecture, creative industries, reputation, selection-system theory, spillover effects


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Date posted: January 21, 2016  

Suggested Citation

Boutinot, Amélie and Ansari, Shaz and Belkhouja, Mustapha and Mangematin, Vincent, Reputational Spillovers: Evidence from French Architecture (2015). Strategic Organization, Vol. 13(4) 284-306, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2718697

Contact Information

Amélie Boutinot
Institut Supérieur de Gestion (ISG), Paris ( email )
Paris
France
Shahzad Ansari (Contact Author)
University of Cambridge - Judge Business School ( email )
Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
Erasmus University, Rotterdam (EUR) ( email )
P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
Mustapha Belkhouja
Grenoble Ecole de Management ( email )
12 Rue Pierre Semard
Grenoble, Cedex 01 38000
France
Vincent Mangematin
Grenoble Ecole de Management ( email )
12 Rue Pierre Semard
Grenoble, Cedex 01 38000
France
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