The Optimal Defense of Network Connectivity

45 Pages Posted: 21 Jan 2016

See all articles by Dan Kovenock

Dan Kovenock

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Brian Roberson

Purdue University - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 12, 2015

Abstract

Maintaining the security of critical infrastructure networks is vital for a modern economy. This paper examines a game-theoretic model of attack and defense of a network in which the defender’s objective is to maintain network connectivity and the attacker’s objective is to destroy a set of nodes that disconnects the network. The conflict at each node is modeled as a contest in which the player that allocates the higher level of force wins the node. Although there are multiple mixed-strategy equilibria, we characterize correlation structures in the players’ multivariate joint distributions of force across nodes that arise in all equilibria. For example, in all equilibria the attacker utilizes a stochastic ‘guerrilla warfare’ strategy in which a single random [minimal] set of nodes that disconnects the network is attacked.

Keywords: allocation game, asymmetric conflict, attack and defense, Colonel Blotto Game, network connectivity, weakest-link, best-shot

JEL Classification: C720, D740

Suggested Citation

Kovenock, Daniel and Roberson, Brian, The Optimal Defense of Network Connectivity (November 12, 2015). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5653, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2719448 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2719448

Daniel Kovenock

Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )

1 University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Brian Roberson (Contact Author)

Purdue University - Department of Economics ( email )

West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

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