Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality

European Constitutional Law Review, Volume 11, Issue 3, December 2015, pp 512-540

University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper 2016-05

31 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2016 Last revised: 2 Dec 2016

See all articles by Dimitry Kochenov

Dimitry Kochenov

CEU Democracy Institute, Budapest; CEU Department of Legal Studies, Vienna

Laurent Pech

UCD Sutherland School of Law; CEU Democracy Institute

Date Written: December 2016

Abstract

This article offers a comprehensive examination of the rationale underlying the rule of law framework adopted by the Commission in March 2014 before outlining its main features. It is argued that while the Commission’s ‘light-touch’ framework falls short of what is required to effectively address internal threats to EU values of a systemic nature, it remains preferable to the new mechanism adopted by the Council in December 2014 and which consists of holding an annual rule of law dialogue among all Member States within the Council. To make the Commission’s framework more workable and effective, which should in turn increase its ‘dissuasive potential’, a number of modest recommendations are also offered at a time where an increasing number of voices are asking the Commission to activate the first phase its new mechanism in relation to Hungary and more recently, Poland.

Keywords: European Union, European Union Values, Rule of Law

Suggested Citation

Kochenov, Dimitry and Kochenov, Dimitry and Pech, Laurent, Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality (December 2016). European Constitutional Law Review, Volume 11, Issue 3, December 2015, pp 512-540, University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper 2016-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2719755

Dimitry Kochenov

CEU Democracy Institute, Budapest ( email )

Nador utca 9
Budapest, H-1051
Hungary

CEU Department of Legal Studies, Vienna ( email )

Quellenstraße 51
Vienna, 1100
Austria

Laurent Pech (Contact Author)

UCD Sutherland School of Law ( email )

Belfield
Dublin 4
Ireland

CEU Democracy Institute

Nador u. 13
Budapest
Hungary

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
625
Abstract Views
2,400
Rank
79,359
PlumX Metrics