Kyoto Commitment and Emission Trading: A European Union Perspective

23 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2001

See all articles by Umberto Ciorba

Umberto Ciorba

ENEA

Alessandro Lanza

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan; CMCC - Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici; Bocconi University - IEFE Centre for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy

Francesco Pauli

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: January 2001

Abstract

This paper presents an estimation of the cost of reducing CO2 emissions as agreed in Kyoto by Annex I countries. Unlike most of the existing literature, this paper focuses on European Union countries' abatement costs and, using a simple model, estimates the role of each EU country within a EU market as well as an Annex 1 market. As a major result, marginal (and total) abatement costs for each EU country (as well as the EU total cost) are presented. Some conclusions on the redistribution of income among market participants related to the trading system are also shown.

Keywords: Environmental Policy, Kyoto Protocol, International Agreements, CO2 Emission, Emission Trading, Marginal Abatement Cost

JEL Classification: C13, C21, C53, Q38, Q41, Q48

Suggested Citation

Ciorba, Umberto and Lanza, Alessandro and Pauli, Francesco, Kyoto Commitment and Emission Trading: A European Union Perspective (January 2001). FEEM Working Paper No. 7.2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=272130 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.272130

Umberto Ciorba

ENEA

Lungo Tevere Thaon di Revel, 76
Rome, 00196
Italy

Alessandro Lanza

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan

Corso Magenta 63
20123 Milan
Italy

CMCC - Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici ( email )

via Augusto Imperatore, 16
Bologna, I-73100
Italy

Bocconi University - IEFE Centre for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy ( email )

viale Filippetti, 9
Milan, 20122
Italy

Francesco Pauli (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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