An Economic Analysis of ‘Comply or Explain Principle’ Under a Review Panel Regime

Account. Econ. Law 2015; 5(3): 295–300

6 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2016

See all articles by Yuri Biondi

Yuri Biondi

French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

Date Written: January 14, 2015

Abstract

This note comments on the Sergakis (2015)’s proposal to amend the ‘comply and explain principle’ concerning corporate governance disclosure through the introduction of a review panel in charge to supervise the disclosure process. Our preliminary economic analysis focuses on the review task that is foreshadowed for this panel that may be established at the macro- or the microlevel. Accordingly, we conclude that the Panel composition, including representatives for stakeholders inside and outside the firms, is critical to discover and obtain disclosure of sensitive information. In fact, although supervised by a review panel, the ‘comply or explain’ mechanism appears still quite unable to obtain disclosure of information that threatens the majority of vested interests represented in the panel.

Keywords: comply or explain, disclosure, corporate governance, financial regulation

Suggested Citation

Biondi, Yuri, An Economic Analysis of ‘Comply or Explain Principle’ Under a Review Panel Regime (January 14, 2015). Account. Econ. Law 2015; 5(3): 295–300. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2723550

Yuri Biondi (Contact Author)

French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) ( email )

IRISSO - University Paris Dauphine PSL
Place Marechal Lattre Tassigny
75016 Paris
France

HOME PAGE: http://yuri.biondi.free.fr/

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
110
rank
243,884
Abstract Views
342
PlumX Metrics
!

Under construction: SSRN citations while be offline until July when we will launch a brand new and improved citations service, check here for more details.

For more information