Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2723693
 


 



Does Antitrust Have a Role to Play in Regulating Big Data?


D. Daniel Sokol


University of Florida - Levin College of Law; George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center

Roisin E. Comerford


Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati

January 27, 2016

Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property and High Tech, Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol editors, Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
The collection of user data online has seen enormous growth in recent years. Consumers have benefitted from the growth through an increase in free or heavily subsidized services, better quality offerings, and rapid innovation. At the same time, the debate about Big Data, and what it really means for consumers and competition, has grown louder. Many have focused on whether Big Data even presents an antitrust issue, and whether and how harms resulting from Big Data should be analyzed and remedied under the antitrust laws. The academic literature, however, has somewhat lagged behind the debate, and a closer inspection of existing scholarly works reveals a dearth of thorough study of the issue. Commentators generally split into two camps: one in favor of more proactive antitrust enforcement in the Big Data realm, and one opposing such intervention, considering antitrust inappropriate for regulation of Big Data. The academic case for the former has not, as yet, been fully developed, and is relatively light at present. Meanwhile, policy-focused work by academics practitioners in this arena suggests that antitrust intervention in Big Data would be premature and misguided, especially considering the myriad pro-competitive benefits offered by Big Data.

In this handbook chapter, we review the scholarly work on the implications of Big Data on competition, and consider the potential role of antitrust in the regulation of Big Data. Part I provides an overview of current, scarce, academic literature specifically addressing the role of antitrust in Big Data issues. Parts II and III delve into the policy issues surrounding Big Data and whether it poses a risk to competition that warrants antitrust intervention. Part II details the ways in which Big Data may prove pro-competitive while Part III reviews and critiques the suggested potential harms to competition from Big Data. Part IV discusses the suitability of antitrust as the institutional choice for Big Data issues, and Part V concludes that, at present, antitrust is ill suited as the institutional choice. This conclusion is further born by the fact that thus far there have been no cases in the United States or Europe that have found Big Data itself to be a basis for a theory of harm on antitrust grounds for mergers or conduct cases. Further, the scholarly case for such harm has not yet been adequately established.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Keywords: antitrust, big data, innovation, online markets, network effects, online search, online platforms, platform competition, exclusion, entry barriers

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L40, L41, L42, L51, 030


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Date posted: January 28, 2016 ; Last revised: February 3, 2016

Suggested Citation

Sokol, D. Daniel and Comerford, Roisin E., Does Antitrust Have a Role to Play in Regulating Big Data? (January 27, 2016). Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property and High Tech, Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol editors, Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2723693

Contact Information

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)
University of Florida - Levin College of Law ( email )
Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol

George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center ( email )
200 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States
Roisin E. Comerford
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati ( email )
650 Page Mill Rd
Palo Alto, CA 94304-1050
United States
Feedback to SSRN


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