Comparison of Voting Procedures Using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy

31 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2016

See all articles by Damien Bol

Damien Bol

King's College London - Department of Political Economy

Arnaud Dellis

Universite du Quebec a Montreal

Mandar Oak

University of Adelaide

Date Written: January 2016

Abstract

We survey the literature that compares the theoretical properties of different voting procedures using models of electoral competition with endogenous candidacy. In particular, we focus on the predictions made by these models regarding the number of candidates running for election and their polarization. We organize the different models into three families based on different assumptions regarding candidate motivation and the timing of candidate entry. We argue that endogenous candidacy models offer both theoretical and empirical advantages over the standard Hotelling-Downs model in the comparison of the properties of alternative voting procedures. On the theoretical front, these models can provide a more satisfactory microfoundation for the emergence and/or stability of a specific configuration of parties or candidates under different voting procedures. On the empirical front these models offer a better account of the stylized facts about elections, particularly when it comes to explaining the cases where Duverger's propositions apply and the cases where they do not. We also point to shortcomings of these models and propose some directions for future research.

Keywords: Voting rules, Candidates, Polarization, Duverger's law, Duverger's hypothesis, Electoral competition, Downsian model, citizen-candidate model

JEL Classification: C72, D72, H11

Suggested Citation

Bol, Damien and Dellis, Arnaud and Oak, Mandar, Comparison of Voting Procedures Using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy (January 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2724832 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2724832

Damien Bol

King's College London - Department of Political Economy ( email )

Strand Campus
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

Arnaud Dellis (Contact Author)

Universite du Quebec a Montreal ( email )

315 St. Catherine Street East
Montreal, Quebec H2X 3X2
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/arnauddellis/

Mandar Oak

University of Adelaide ( email )

No 233 North Terrace, School of Commerce
Adelaide, South Australia 5005
Australia

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