Cheating in the Lab Predicts Fraud in the Field. An Experiment in Public Transportations

GATE Working Paper No. 1605, 2016

62 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2016 Last revised: 20 May 2016

See all articles by Zhixin Dai

Zhixin Dai

School of Finance, Renmin University of China; GATE CNRS UMR 5824; University of Lyon

Fabio Galeotti

GATE, CNRS

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 1, 2016

Abstract

We conduct an artefactual field experiment using a diversified sample of passengers of public transportations to study attitudes towards dishonesty. We find that the diversity of behavior in terms of dis/honesty in laboratory tasks and in the field correlate. Moreover, individuals who have just been fined in the field behave more honestly in the lab than the other fare-dodgers, except when context is introduced. Overall, we show that simple tests of dishonesty in the lab can predict moral firmness in life, although frauders who care about social image cheat less when behavior can be verified ex post by the experimenter.

Keywords: Dishonesty, fare-dodging, field experiment, external validity, public transportations

JEL Classification: B41, C91, C93, K42

Suggested Citation

Dai, Zhixin and Galeotti, Fabio and Villeval, Marie Claire, Cheating in the Lab Predicts Fraud in the Field. An Experiment in Public Transportations (May 1, 2016). GATE Working Paper No. 1605, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2725911 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2725911

Zhixin Dai (Contact Author)

School of Finance, Renmin University of China ( email )

59 Zhongguancun Street
Beijing, 100872
China

GATE CNRS UMR 5824 ( email )

93 Chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69009
France

University of Lyon ( email )

Faculté de Sciences Economiques et de Gestion
16, quai Claude Bernard
Lyon, 69007
France

Fabio Galeotti

GATE, CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.gate.cnrs.fr/spip.php?article795

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France
+33 472 86 60 79 (Phone)
+33 472 86 60 90 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/marie-claire-villeval

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Global Labor Organization (GLO) ( email )

Collogne
Germany

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