'Money Blinding' as a Solution to Biased Design and Conduct of Scientific Research

in Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselhein, eds., BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW (Elsevier, 2016), Forthcoming

Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 16-1

20 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2016

See all articles by Christopher T. Robertson

Christopher T. Robertson

University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law; Harvard University - Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics

Marc A. Rodwin

Suffolk University Law School; Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

Blinding has become an important method to prevent doctors and patients from providing biased data for biomedical research. However, when commercial interests select and fund the investigators, the overall design, conduct, and reporting of scientific research may still be biased toward suggesting products being tested are safer and more efficacious than they really are. We review some of the history around the concept of having biomedical research conducted independently of industry. One approach would be to have companies fund the research on their products but have an intermediary select independent investigators to design and conduct the research. This solution can be considered a form of “blinding.” We explore the potential benefits and limitations of money blinding. We then examine steps that various actors can take to promote the adoption of money blinding. Finally, we explore some ways that biomedical journals or the federal government could cause blinding to be adopted.

Suggested Citation

Robertson, Christopher T. and Rodwin, Marc A., 'Money Blinding' as a Solution to Biased Design and Conduct of Scientific Research (2016). in Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselhein, eds., BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW (Elsevier, 2016), Forthcoming; Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 16-1. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2726658

Christopher T. Robertson

University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 210176
Tucson, AZ 85721-0176
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.arizona.edu/faculty/getprofile.cfm?facultyid=714

Harvard University - Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics ( email )

23 Everett Street
Cambridge, MA 02155
United States

Marc A. Rodwin (Contact Author)

Suffolk University Law School ( email )

120 Tremont Street
Boston, MA 02108-4977
United States
617-573-8354 (Phone)
617-305-3087 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.suffolk.edu/faculty/directories/faculty.cfm?InstructorID=48

Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics ( email )

124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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