Securities Litigation and Enforcement in Austria

Pierre-Henri Conac and Martin Gelter (eds.), GLOBAL SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming)

Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2726661

38 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2016

See all articles by Martin Gelter

Martin Gelter

Fordham University School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Michael Pucher

Vienna University of Economics and Business

Date Written: February 7, 2016

Abstract

This chapter surveys Austrian securities law and its enforcement. Sections 1 and 2 provide an overview of the Austrian financial market and the applicable regulatory framework, particularly with respect to false and misleading disclosures by issuers. Section 3 surveys securities regulation in Austria, focusing on disclosure requirements and enforcement activities set by the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA). Section 4 discusses private enforcement, looking both at legal requirements for the liability of both the issuer and responsible individuals, as well as procedural aspects. In the past years, so-called “Austrian-style class actions”, a technique developed by practicing attorneys, have gained in significance. While these lawsuits have enabled large numbers of investors to aggregate their claims, they are based on an opt-in system and therefore do not create the opportunities and incentives of American securities class actions. The chapter also discusses information asymmetries between plaintiffs and defendants as well as conflict of laws issues in securities litigation.

Keywords: securities litigation, Austrian-style class actions, FMA, issuer liability, ownership structure, FMA, Vienna Stock Exchange

JEL Classification: G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Gelter, Martin and Pucher, Michael, Securities Litigation and Enforcement in Austria (February 7, 2016). Pierre-Henri Conac and Martin Gelter (eds.), GLOBAL SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming) ; Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2726661. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2726661

Martin Gelter (Contact Author)

Fordham University School of Law ( email )

150 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
646-312-8752 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.fordham.edu/info/23135/martin_gelter

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

HOME PAGE: http://ecgi.global/users/martin-gelter

Michael Pucher

Vienna University of Economics and Business ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, Wien 1020
Austria

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