Accounting for Stylised Facts About Recent Anti‐Dumping: Retaliation and Innovation

15 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2016

See all articles by Kaz Miyagiwa

Kaz Miyagiwa

Emory University - Department of Economics; Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER); Florida International University (FIU) - Department of Economics

Huasheng Song

Zhejiang University - Center for Research of Private Economy (CRPE)

Hylke Vandenbussche

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL), CEPR

Date Written: February 2016

Abstract

Recent work has found certain stylised facts about anti‐dumping (AD) actions. (i) AD actions are mostly between industrial and developing countries; (ii) developing countries use AD to retaliate against industrial countries; and (iii) AD is concentrated in R&D‐intensive industries. This study develops an analytical framework that can account for these empirical findings. The model suggests that market expansions and/or improvement in R&D capability in the South are essential in avoiding AD wars with the North. Interestingly, stricter enforcement of intellectual property rights in the South has little effect on stopping AD wars between the North and the South.

Suggested Citation

Miyagiwa, Kaz and Song, Huasheng and Vandenbussche, Hylke, Accounting for Stylised Facts About Recent Anti‐Dumping: Retaliation and Innovation (February 2016). The World Economy, Vol. 39, Issue 2, pp. 221-235, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2726959 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/twec.12371

Kaz Miyagiwa (Contact Author)

Emory University - Department of Economics ( email )

1602 Fishburne Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki Osaka 567-0047
Japan

Florida International University (FIU) - Department of Economics ( email )

Miami, FL 33199
United States

Huasheng Song

Zhejiang University - Center for Research of Private Economy (CRPE) ( email )

Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310027
China

Hylke Vandenbussche

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL), CEPR ( email )

Faculty of Economics
Naamsestraat 69
B-3000 Leuven, 3000
Belgium
+32 16 326 920 (Phone)
+32 16 326 732 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: https://www.sites.google.com/site/vandenbusschehylke/home-1

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