Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2727118
 


 



TTIP's Regulatory Cooperation and the Future of Precaution in Europe


Marija Bartl


University of Amsterdam - Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL)

February 3, 2016

Postnational Rulemaking Working Paper No. 2016-02
Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2016-07
Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series No. 2016-01

Abstract:     
This paper analyses the possible impact of TTIP's Regulatory Cooperation on the implementation of the precautionary principle in the EU. The European Commission argues that regulatory cooperation will not impinge on the application of the precautionary principle because, first, it does not change the legislative framework of precautionary legislation and, second, the 'right to regulate' will be safeguarded by the TTIP's horizontal chapters. In this paper I argue, however, that these guarantees are insufficient. Given the methodological and institutional constraints presented by the TTIP's institutional design, regulatory cooperation will undermine the precautionary approach to regulation in the longer run.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: TTIP, regulatory cooperation, precautionary principle, European law, right to regulate, international trade

JEL Classification: K33


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Date posted: February 3, 2016 ; Last revised: March 9, 2016

Suggested Citation

Bartl, Marija, TTIP's Regulatory Cooperation and the Future of Precaution in Europe (February 3, 2016). Postnational Rulemaking Working Paper No. 2016-02; Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2016-07; Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series No. 2016-01. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2727118 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2727118

Contact Information

Marija Bartl (Contact Author)
University of Amsterdam - Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL) ( email )
P.O. Box 1030
Amsterdam, 1000 BA
Netherlands
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