Tax Competition with Heterogeneous Capital Mobility

27 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2016

See all articles by Steeve Mongrain

Steeve Mongrain

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics

John D. Wilson

Michigan State University - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 2015

Abstract

An ongoing debate in the tax competition literature is the desirability for a system of countries, or regions, to restrict the preferential treatment of different forms of capital. A widespread belief is that without such restrictions, countries would aggressively compete for mobile capital, resulting in taxes that are far below their desirable level. We further investigate this question by departing from the bulk of the literature in three important ways. First, we assume that in addition of caring about tax revenue, countries also care about private sector income. Second, firms are distinguished by their country of origin. Finally, we consider both identical countries and countries that differ in size. We demonstrate how the relative desirability of the two tax regimes depends critically on country size differences and the distribution of moving costs. In some cases, preferential treatment is preferable. Large and small countries may also disagree about which regime is best.

Keywords: tax competition, heterogeneity, preferential tax treatment

JEL Classification: H730, H770, H710

Suggested Citation

Mongrain, Steeve and Wilson, John D., Tax Competition with Heterogeneous Capital Mobility (December 2015). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5688. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2727162

Steeve Mongrain

Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics ( email )

8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6
Canada
604-291-3547 (Phone)
604-291-5944 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sfu.ca/~mongrain/

John D. Wilson (Contact Author)

Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )

East Lansing, MI 48824
United States

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