Enforcement of Financial Reporting: A Corporate Governance Perspective

48 Pages Posted: 5 Feb 2016

See all articles by Matthias Hoeltken

Matthias Hoeltken

Handelshochschule Leipzig (HHL) - Department of Accounting & Auditing

Germar Ebner

Handelshochschule Leipzig (HHL)

Date Written: December 18, 2015

Abstract

The main objective of financial reporting is to provide useful information to a firm’s stakeholders. However, it is questionable whether this goal can be fully realized without effective enforcement, which ensures faithful and consistent application of the relevant accounting standards. Within the multiplicity of studies investigating enforcement mechanisms and consequences to enforcement actions, this paper provides an overview on the current state of research on enforcement from a corporate governance perspective. We therefore analyze enforcement literature from both internal and external corporate governance perspectives in order to show interactions between enforcement and other mechanisms of financial reporting oversight. In addition, it becomes evident that most preceding research addresses neither efficiency nor efficacy of enforcement systems due to missing effect variables or data accessibility. Furthermore, we deduce further research opportunities with respect to enforcement consequences and their determinants.

Keywords: Enforcement, IFRS, Corporate Governance, Regulation, Research Opportunities

JEL Classification: G18, G34, K22, M41, M48

Suggested Citation

Hoeltken, Matthias and Ebner, Germar, Enforcement of Financial Reporting: A Corporate Governance Perspective (December 18, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2727656. or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2727656

Matthias Hoeltken (Contact Author)

Handelshochschule Leipzig (HHL) - Department of Accounting & Auditing ( email )

Leipzig, D-04109
Germany

Germar Ebner

Handelshochschule Leipzig (HHL) ( email )

Jahnallee 59
Leipzig, 04109
Germany

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