Earmarking Away the Public Interest: How Congressional Republicans Use Antiregulatory Appropriations Riders to Benefit Powerful Polluting Industries

22 Pages Posted: 5 Feb 2016

See all articles by Thomas Owen McGarity

Thomas Owen McGarity

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Richard W. Murphy

Texas Tech University School of Law

James Goodwin

Center for Progressive Reform

Date Written: July 1, 2015

Abstract

This report examines a legislative weapon that conservative opponents of public safeguards have used with increasing regularity in recent years: anti-regulatory appropriations riders. Opponents of regulation insert these provisions into must-pass appropriations bills to block agencies from using funding to develop or enforce particular regulatory actions.

This report examines the numerous policy problems associated with the use of antiregulatory appropriation riders, as well as the various institutional reasons for why these riders will continue to be abused for the foreseeable future.

It concludes by offering detailed recommendations for curbing the abusive misuse of antiregulatory riders.

Keywords: Congress, Regulations, Appropriations, Riders

JEL Classification: K23, K32, H1

Suggested Citation

McGarity, Thomas Owen and Murphy, Richard Wyman and Goodwin, James, Earmarking Away the Public Interest: How Congressional Republicans Use Antiregulatory Appropriations Riders to Benefit Powerful Polluting Industries (July 1, 2015). U of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 651. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2727866 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2727866

Thomas Owen McGarity

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law ( email )

727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States
512-232-1384 (Phone)

Richard Wyman Murphy

Texas Tech University School of Law ( email )

1802 Hartford
Lubbock, TX 79409
United States
806-742-3990 ex.320 (Phone)

James Goodwin (Contact Author)

Center for Progressive Reform ( email )

455 Massachusetts Ave., NW, #150-513
Washington, DC 20001
United States

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