Unanimous Implementation: A Case for Approval Mechanisms

25 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2016 Last revised: 1 Jul 2016

See all articles by Matias Nuñez

Matias Nuñez

Université Paris Dauphine

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus

Date Written: June 30, 2016

Abstract

We design the class of (indirect) Approval mechanisms which allow the players' strategies to coincide with the subsets of the outcome space. By focusing on the single-peaked domain, we prove that: a) Each of these mechanisms is characterized by a unique equilibrium outcome, and b) for almost every implementable welfare optimum (outcome of a social choice rule), including the Condorcet winner alternative, there exists an Approval mechanism that unanimously implements it. That is, Approval mechanisms help a society achieve every feasible welfare goal, and, perhaps more importantly, they promote social coherence: The implemented outcome is approved by everyone.

Keywords: Nash Implementation, Strategy-proof, Unanimity, Indirect Mechanisms

JEL Classification: C9, D71, D78, H41

Suggested Citation

Nuñez, Matias and Xefteris, Dimitrios, Unanimous Implementation: A Case for Approval Mechanisms (June 30, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2728337 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2728337

Matias Nuñez (Contact Author)

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

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