Supply and Demand for Discrimination: Strategic Revelation of Own Characteristics in a Trust Game

10 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2016 Last revised: 27 Jun 2021

See all articles by Anthony G. Heyes

Anthony G. Heyes

University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics

John A. List

University of Chicago - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: February 2016

Abstract

There is a large and diverse body of evidence that people condition their behavior on the characteristics of others. If type is visible then one agent seeing another with whom they are interacting, or observing some other close proxy for type, can affect outcomes. We explore the economics of revealing type in a simple laboratory experiment to learn about the underlying motivations for discrimination.

Suggested Citation

Heyes, Anthony and List, John A., Supply and Demand for Discrimination: Strategic Revelation of Own Characteristics in a Trust Game (February 2016). NBER Working Paper No. w21953, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2729054

Anthony Heyes (Contact Author)

University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics ( email )

Royal Holloway College
Egham
Surrey, Surrey TW20 0EX
United Kingdom
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44-(0)1784 43-9534 (Fax)

John A. List

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

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United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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