The Efficiency of Crackdowns: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Public Transportations

GATE Working Paper No. 1607, 2016

29 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2016

See all articles by Zhixin Dai

Zhixin Dai

School of Finance, Renmin University of China; GATE CNRS UMR 5824; University of Lyon

Fabio Galeotti

GATE, CNRS

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Global Labor Organization (GLO)

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Date Written: February 8, 2016

Abstract

The concentration of high frequency controls in a limited period of time (“crackdowns”) constitutes an important feature of many law-enforcement policies around the world. In this paper, we offer a comprehensive investigation on the relative efficiency and effectiveness of various crackdown policies using a lab-in-the-field experiment with real passengers of a public transport service. We introduce a novel game, the daily public transportation game, where subjects have to decide, over many periods, whether to buy or not a ticket knowing that there might be a control. Our results show that (a) concentrated crackdowns are less effective and efficient than random controls; (b) prolonged crackdowns reduce fare-dodging during the period of intense monitoring but induces a burst of fraud as soon as they are withdrawn; (c) pre-announced controls induces more fraud in the periods without control. Overall, we also observe that real fare-dodgers fraud more in the experiment than non-faredodgers.

Keywords: Crackdowns, fraud, risk, monitoring, transportation, field experiment

JEL Classification: C91, D83, K42

Suggested Citation

Dai, Zhixin and Galeotti, Fabio and Villeval, Marie Claire, The Efficiency of Crackdowns: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Public Transportations (February 8, 2016). GATE Working Paper No. 1607, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2729244 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2729244

Zhixin Dai (Contact Author)

School of Finance, Renmin University of China ( email )

59 Zhongguancun Street
Beijing, 100872
China

GATE CNRS UMR 5824 ( email )

93 Chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69009
France

University of Lyon ( email )

Faculté de Sciences Economiques et de Gestion
16, quai Claude Bernard
Lyon, 69007
France

Fabio Galeotti

GATE, CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.gate.cnrs.fr/spip.php?article795

Marie Claire Villeval

Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France
+33 472 86 60 79 (Phone)
+33 472 86 60 90 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/marie-claire-villeval

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Global Labor Organization (GLO) ( email )

Collogne
Germany

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