Tax Treaties as a Network Product

22 Pages Posted: 11 Feb 2016 Last revised: 2 Dec 2017

See all articles by Tsilly Dagan

Tsilly Dagan

University of Oxford, Faculty of Law; Bar Ilan University

Date Written: January 6, 2016

Abstract

The copiousness of tax treaties is often presented as living proof not only of their success but also of their desirability. However, in focusing on alleviating double taxation by allocating tax revenues, the treaties project is a missed opportunity. This article explains that an international tax standard is a network product and uses network theory to explore the potential advantages and drawbacks of the tax treaty network in entrenching such a standard. Networks facilitate stability and self-enforcement. By joining a network (or staying in one), the users benefit from the compatibility with other users, which incentivizes new users to join and current users to remain, even in the absence of an enforcement mechanism. These advantages are not, however, without costs. Similarly to some other networks, the tax treaties network is locked in a suboptimal standard, which leaves unattended points of friction between jurisdictions as well as allows the network initiators (i.e., developed countries) to disproportionately benefit from it at the expense of other users (i.e., developing countries) and, potentially, at the expense of taxpayers.

Keywords: Tax Treaties, Networks, International Tax Policy

Suggested Citation

Dagan, Tsilly, Tax Treaties as a Network Product (January 6, 2016). Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2730424

Tsilly Dagan (Contact Author)

University of Oxford, Faculty of Law ( email )

St Cross Building
St Cross Rd
Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom

Bar Ilan University ( email )

Ramat Gan
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel

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