Political Influence and Its Relation to the Federal Prosecution of Public Corruption

46 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2016 Last revised: 3 Jul 2017

See all articles by Jamie Bologna Pavlik

Jamie Bologna Pavlik

Texas Tech University - Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics

Date Written: May 24, 2017

Abstract

In the US, federal prosecutors are appointed by the president, confirmed by the Senate, and have significant discretion over which cases they choose to take to court. Federal prosecutors handling an overwhelming majority of corruption cases invites the possibility of political influence in the monitoring of corruption. Additionally, political disparities across states may result in differences in corrupt behavior. Using individual case level data, I examine the effect political factors have on federal corruption cases, with an emphasis on states that are an important focus in the next presidential election. I find that corruption convictions tend to be higher in politically important states. This effect seems more significant when Democratic administrations are in power. In addition, it seems that these effects are relevant only for corruption crimes labeled as “federal”.

Keywords: Corruption, corruption convictions, political bias

JEL Classification: D7, D72, D73

Suggested Citation

Bologna Pavlik, Jamie, Political Influence and Its Relation to the Federal Prosecution of Public Corruption (May 24, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2731250 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2731250

Jamie Bologna Pavlik (Contact Author)

Texas Tech University - Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics ( email )

Suite 167, 2625 Memorial Circle
TTU Administration
Lubbock, TX 79409
United States

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