Geographic Location, Foreign Ownership, and Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from Privatization

Abstract

Motivated by recent research on the link between geographic proximity and information risk, we examine the impact of geographic location on a firm’s ownership structure and cost of equity capital using a large sample of newly privatized firms from 47 countries. We find that the greater the firm’s distance from domestic financial centers, the lower foreign investors’ participation and ownership. We also find that strong country-level institutions governing investor protection reduce the information disadvantage of foreign investors. In additional analyses, we find that investors require higher cost of equity capital for distant privatized firms, especially in countries with weak governance institutions. We conclude that geographic location is an important determinant of post-privatization ownership structure and cost of equity capital. Our results are robust to alternative explanations and suggest that improving country-level governance institutions can mitigate the adverse effect of location in remote areas.

Keywords: Privatization, geographic location, ownership structure

JEL Classification: G32, G34