The Impact of Negatively Reciprocal Inclinations on Worker Behavior: Evidence from a Retrenchment of Pension Rights

35 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2016

See all articles by Raymond Michel Montizaan

Raymond Michel Montizaan

Maastricht University - Department of Accounting and Information Management

Andries de Grip

Maastricht School of Business and Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Frank Cörvers

Maastricht University

Thomas J. Dohmen

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Maastricht University - Business Investment Research Center (BIRC)

Date Written: August 17, 2015

Abstract

We document that the strength of negatively reciprocal inclinations affects workers' reaction to unfair treatment. We exploit unique matched survey and administrative data on male public sector employees in the Netherlands and compare the job motivation of employees born in 1950, who faced a substantial retrenchment of their pension rights resulting from a pension reform in 2006, to that of slightly older employees who remained entitled to more generous pension benefits. Job motivation is significantly lower among negatively reciprocal employees who were affected by the reform. The adverse effect on job motivation is stronger for negative reciprocal employees born very shortly after the cut-off date of January 1,1950, as well as for those with many untreated colleagues who perceive the policy change as being more unfair. The treatment effect is stronger among workers who are more likely to hold their employer accountable for the drop in their pension rights.

Keywords: reciprocity, job motivation, retrenchment of pension rights

Suggested Citation

Montizaan, Raymond Michel and de Grip, Andries and Corvers, Frank and Dohmen, Thomas, The Impact of Negatively Reciprocal Inclinations on Worker Behavior: Evidence from a Retrenchment of Pension Rights (August 17, 2015). Netspar Discussion Paper No. 08/2015-058. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2731651 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2731651

Raymond Michel Montizaan (Contact Author)

Maastricht University - Department of Accounting and Information Management ( email )

Netherlands

Andries De Grip

Maastricht School of Business and Economics ( email )

P. O. Box 616
Maastricht, NL 6200 MD
Netherlands

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Frank Corvers

Maastricht University ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200MD
Netherlands

Thomas Dohmen

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Maastricht University - Business Investment Research Center (BIRC) ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands
+31-43-388 3832 (Phone)
+31-43-388 4856 (Fax)

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