Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

34 Pages Posted: 14 Jun 2001

See all articles by Luca Anderlini

Luca Anderlini

Georgetown University - Department of Economics

Leonardo Felli

University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2001

Abstract

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex-post the court observes whether an unforeseen contingency occurred, and decides whether to void or uphold the contract. If the court voids the contract, the parties can renegotiate a new agreement ex-post. There are two effects of a court that voids more contracts. The parties' incentives to undertake relationship-specific investment are reduced, while the parties enjoy greater insurance against the unforeseen contingencies that the ex-ante contract cannot take into account. In this context, we are able to characterize fully the optimal decision rule for the court. The behavior of the optimal court is determined by the trade-off between the need for incentives and the gains from insurance that voiding in some circumstances offers to the agents.

Keywords: Optimal courts, unforeseen contingencies, risk, incentives

JEL Classification: C79, D74, D89, K40, L14

Suggested Citation

Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo and Postlewaite, Andrew, Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies (June 2001). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2835. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=273198

Luca Anderlini (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-6361 (Phone)
202-687-6102 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/la2/

Leonardo Felli

University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics ( email )

Austin Robinson Building
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DD
United Kingdom
+44 1223 335221 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.felli.info

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7350 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~apostlew

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