Cumul de mandats d’administrateur et risques anticoncurrentiels: Un vide juridique en Europe? (Interlocking Directorates and Anti-Competitive Risks: An Enforcement Gap in Europe?)

Concurrences N° 1-2016

14 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2016

See all articles by Florence Thépot

Florence Thépot

University of Glasgow; Droit & Croissance (Rules for Growth)

Florian Hugon

Droit & Croissance (Rules for Growth)

Mathieu Luinaud

Droit & Croissance (Rules for Growth)

Date Written: February 15, 2016

Abstract

French Abstract: Souvent occultée par les situations de prises de participations minoritaires, la pratique des cumuls de mandats d’administrateur entre concurrents n’est pas sans susciter un risque d’effets anticoncurrentiels. Cette contribution s’attache, à partir d’une analyse systématique des instruments existants, à déterminer si le droit des sociétés et les principes de gouvernance d’entreprise peuvent efficacement suppléer le droit de la concurrence dans le traitement des effets négatifs induits par les cumuls, et à mettre ainsi en lumière l’existence d’un vide juridique en Europe.

English Abstract: Interlocking directorates between competitors may raise significant anti-competitive risks, which attract little attention in comparison to that posed by other structural links, such as minority shareholdings. This article provides a systematic analysis of the ability of current legal tools of competition law, as well as of company law and corporate governance to address those anti-competitive risks, and thereby, highlights the existence of an enforcement gap in Europe.

Note: Downloadable document is in French.

Keywords: Competition law, Antitrust, Corporate Governance, Corporate Law, Company Law

JEL Classification: K21, K22

Suggested Citation

Thépot, Florence and Hugon, Florian and Luinaud, Mathieu, Cumul de mandats d’administrateur et risques anticoncurrentiels: Un vide juridique en Europe? (Interlocking Directorates and Anti-Competitive Risks: An Enforcement Gap in Europe?) (February 15, 2016). Concurrences N° 1-2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2732851

Florence Thépot (Contact Author)

University of Glasgow ( email )

5-9 The Square
University of Glasgow
Glasgow, G12 8QQ
United Kingdom

Droit & Croissance (Rules for Growth) ( email )

c/o Institut Louis Bachelier
29 place de la Bourse
Paris, 75002
France

Florian Hugon

Droit & Croissance (Rules for Growth) ( email )

c/o Institut Louis Bachelier
29 place de la Bourse
Paris, 75002
France

Mathieu Luinaud

Droit & Croissance (Rules for Growth) ( email )

c/o Institut Louis Bachelier
29 place de la Bourse
Paris, 75002
France

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