Reforming the Legal and Institutional Framework for the Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Claims in Portugal

42 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2016

See all articles by Sebastiaan Pompe

Sebastiaan Pompe

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Wolfgang Bergthaler

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Date Written: December 2015

Abstract

This paper discusses the recent major reforms in the area of civil and commercial claims enforcement undertaken by the Portuguese authorities in the context of the IMF/EU-supported adjustment program. The economic literature has long recognized that slow claims enforcement affects economic growth, foreign direct investment, credit and labor markets, and firm size. The Portuguese authorities together with IMF/EU staff deployed a novel approach that has focused on incentives tackling weaknesses in the enforcement process with the aim of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of claims enforcement and resolving court backlogs. The paper finds impressive quantifiable changes affecting, in particular, court backlog reduction, court processing speed, and private debt recovery. The economic literature suggests that this will impact positively on the payment culture and overall growth, even if such impact cannot be determined at this stage.

Keywords: judicial reform, civil and commercial claims enforcement, macro-criticality, courts, enforcement, claims, debt, credit, investment, General, General, General,

JEL Classification: K10, K30, K40

Suggested Citation

Pompe, Sebastiaan and Bergthaler, Wolfgang, Reforming the Legal and Institutional Framework for the Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Claims in Portugal (December 2015). IMF Working Paper No. 15/279. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2733582

Sebastiaan Pompe (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Wolfgang Bergthaler

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

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