Corporate Criminal Law and Organization Incentives: A Managerial Perspective

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 529

20 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2001

See all articles by Nuno Garoupa

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: November 2001

Abstract

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees.

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno, Corporate Criminal Law and Organization Incentives: A Managerial Perspective (November 2001). UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 529. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=273417 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.273417

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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