So You're Telling Me There's a Chance: How the Articles on State Responsibility Could Empower Corporate Responses to State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks

Harvard Nat'l Security J. Features (Dec. 17, 2015)

14 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2016

See all articles by Daniel Garrie

Daniel Garrie

Law & Forensics; Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Shane Reeves

United States Military Academy, West Point

Date Written: December 17, 2015

Abstract

This article begins with a brief summary of the international legal framework that regulates state interactions. The legal authority for government sanctioned corporate countermeasures, as well as the limitation on these actions, becomes apparent through this framework. The reasons that targeted states need to invoke this authority and how they should limit the countermeasures will follow. The article concludes with a recommendation that host states, despite the associated risks with such a decision, empower victimized corporations with the authority to use countermeasures in response to hostile state cyber activity.

Keywords: law of armed conflict, articles of state responsibility, countermeasures, cyber warfare, corporations, cyber criminals, cyber attack, non-state actors, international humanitarian law

JEL Classification: K00, K22, K33

Suggested Citation

Garrie, Daniel and Reeves, Shane, So You're Telling Me There's a Chance: How the Articles on State Responsibility Could Empower Corporate Responses to State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks (December 17, 2015). Harvard Nat'l Security J. Features (Dec. 17, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2734419

Daniel Garrie

Law & Forensics ( email )

6506 3rd Ave NW
Suite C
Seattle, WA 98117
United States
855 529 2466 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.lawandforensics.com

Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law ( email )

55 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY 10003
United States

Shane Reeves (Contact Author)

United States Military Academy, West Point ( email )

600 Thayer Rd
West Point, NY 10996
United States

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