Global Tax Governance. What's Wrong with it and How to Fix it.

Dietsch, Peter; Rixen, Thomas (2015) Global Tax Governance. What’s wrong with it and how to fix it. ECPR Press: Colchester, i.E.

Posted: 19 Feb 2016

See all articles by Thomas Rixen

Thomas Rixen

University of Bamberg - Department of Political Science

Peter Dietsch

University of Montreal

Date Written: 2015

Abstract

Commercial banks such as UBS and HSBC embroiled in scandals that in some cases exposed lawmakers themselves as tax evaders, multinationals such as Google and Apple using the Double Irish and other tax avoidance strategies, governments granting fiscal sweetheart deals behind closed doors as in Luxembourg - the stream of news items documenting the crisis of global tax governance is not about to dry up. Much work has been done in individual disciplines on the phenomenon of tax competition that lies at the heart of this crisis. Yet, the combination of issues of democratic legitimacy, social justice, economic efficiency, and national sovereignty that tax competition raises clearly requires an interdisciplinary analysis. This book offers a rare example of this kind of work, bringing together experts from political science, philosophy, law, and economics whose contributions combine empirical analysis with normative and institutional proposals. It makes an important contribution to reforming international taxation.

Suggested Citation

Rixen, Thomas and Dietsch, Peter, Global Tax Governance. What's Wrong with it and How to Fix it. (2015). Dietsch, Peter; Rixen, Thomas (2015) Global Tax Governance. What’s wrong with it and how to fix it. ECPR Press: Colchester, i.E. , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2734829

Thomas Rixen (Contact Author)

University of Bamberg - Department of Political Science ( email )

Feldkirchenstrasse 21
96045 Bamberg
Germany

Peter Dietsch

University of Montreal ( email )

C.P. 6128 succursale Centre-ville
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
933
PlumX Metrics