On Legal Cooperation and the Dynamics of Legal Convergence

41 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2016

See all articles by Bertrand Crettez

Bertrand Crettez

University of Burgundy Franche-Comté - L.I.B.R.E.

Bruno Deffains

Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas; Institut Universitaire de France

Olivier Musy

Paris II Panthéon Assas

Date Written: May 27, 2010

Abstract

In this paper, we study the dynamics of legal convergence and the comparison between the different instruments of legal convergence based on cooperative strategies (i.e., harmonization and unification) or not. To study these questions we use a model with two nation-states which is inspired in part by that used in Carbonara and Parisi (2008) where preferences of each nation-state are such that it is costly to change the law, but it is also costly to have a different legal system from the other nation-state. We show that legal unification could be achieved in the long-run through small step by step changes despite the existence of huge harmonization costs in the short run. We also show that legal cooperation is not always necessary to achieve legal convergence.

Keywords: Law-and-Economics, Legal Convergence, Legal harmonization, Legal Uniformization

JEL Classification: C72, K0

Suggested Citation

Crettez, Bertrand and Deffains, Bruno and Musy, Olivier, On Legal Cooperation and the Dynamics of Legal Convergence (May 27, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2735679 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2735679

Bertrand Crettez

University of Burgundy Franche-Comté - L.I.B.R.E. ( email )

avenue de l'Observatoire
F25030 Besancon
France

Bruno Deffains

Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas ( email )

12 place du Pantheon
Paris cedex 05, 75005
France

Institut Universitaire de France ( email )

103, bld Saint-Michel
75005 Paris
France

Olivier Musy (Contact Author)

Paris II Panthéon Assas ( email )

12 place du Pantheon
Paris
France

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