Resource Rents, Coercion, and Local Development: Evidence from Post-Apartheid South Africa

49 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016 Last revised: 27 Apr 2018

See all articles by Paulo Bastos

Paulo Bastos

World Bank; Technical University of Lisbon (UTL) - Research Unit on Complexity and Economics (UECE); ISEG Lisbon School of Economics and Management,Universidade de Lisboa

Nicolas Bottan

Cornell University - Department of Policy Analysis and Management

Date Written: February 22, 2016

Abstract

This paper examines how the dismantling of coercive institutions associated with the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 affected the distribution of rents from natural resource exports. It identifies the interplay between coercive institutions and natural resource rents as an important driver of local development. Using data from the 1996 census, the paper documents large income gaps between communities located just-inside and just-outside the former self-governing territories set aside for black inhabitants. Examining relative changes between 1996 and 2011, the paper finds that spatial income convergence was considerably stronger among marginalized communities with higher initial exposure to resource rents. These results accord with standard bargaining theory in which the dismantling of coercive institutions improves the negotiating position of unionized workers in the mining industry.

Keywords: Mining & Extractive Industry (Non-Energy), Rural Labor Markets, Labor Markets, Labor & Employment Law

Suggested Citation

Bastos, Paulo and Bottan, Nicolas Luis, Resource Rents, Coercion, and Local Development: Evidence from Post-Apartheid South Africa (February 22, 2016). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7572, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2736623

Technical University of Lisbon (UTL) - Research Unit on Complexity and Economics (UECE) ( email )

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Lisboa, 1200-781
Portugal

ISEG Lisbon School of Economics and Management,Universidade de Lisboa ( email )

Rua do Quelhas 6
LISBOA, 1200-781
Portugal

Nicolas Luis Bottan

Cornell University - Department of Policy Analysis and Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY
United States
6072555724 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.nicolasbottan.com

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