Hybrid Tribunals as a Viable Transitional Justice Mechanism to Combat Impunity in Post-Conflict Situations

28 Pages Posted: 27 Feb 2016 Last revised: 28 Apr 2019

See all articles by Alberto Costi

Alberto Costi

Victoria University of Wellington - Faculty of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

Since the end of the 1990s, the international community has increasingly relied on hybrid or mixed tribunals to prosecute international crimes in the aftermath of armed conflict. Hybrid tribunals rely on national laws, judges and prosecutors, contributing to the capacity-building of the local judiciary and the legal system; while also including international standards, personnel, resources, experience and technical knowledge, conferring legitimacy upon them. At the same time, hybrid tribunals pose real problems in their attempt to incorporate different types of law, different levels of expertise and different models of management and funding. The emergence of hybrid tribunals in East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia, and recent moves in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Burundi are indicative that hybrid tribunals will be central to the development of international criminal law in the coming decades. This article looks at the emergence of hybrid tribunals, analyses their practice and highlights their possible limitations.  

Keywords: Hybrid, tribunals, international, crimes, human, rights, Nuremberg, ICC, prosecution, war crimes

JEL Classification: K00, K1, K10, K14, K19, K2, K20, K3, K33, K42, K41, K40, K49

Suggested Citation

Costi, Alberto, Hybrid Tribunals as a Viable Transitional Justice Mechanism to Combat Impunity in Post-Conflict Situations (2006). 22(2) NZULR, 213-239, 2008 ; Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Paper No. 13/2019. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2738209

Alberto Costi (Contact Author)

Victoria University of Wellington - Faculty of Law ( email )

PO Box 600
Wellington, 6140
New Zealand

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
92
Abstract Views
460
rank
236,079
PlumX Metrics