The Impact of Managerial Change on Performance: The Role of Team Heterogeneity

22 Pages Posted: 26 Feb 2016

See all articles by Gerd Muehlheusser

Gerd Muehlheusser

University of Hamburg; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Sandra Schneemann

Bielefeld University

Dirk Sliwka

University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: April 2016

Abstract

When a key responsibility of a manager is to allocate more or less attractive tasks, subordinates have an incentive to work hard and demonstrate their talents. As a new manager is less well informed, management dismissals reinvigorate this tournament competition - but only in sufficiently homogeneous teams. We investigate this hypothesis using a large dataset on dismissals of soccer coaches, whose main task is indeed the selection of players. We find that dismissals enhance performance (only) in homogeneous teams. Moreover, we show that there is typically a negative selection bias when evaluating succession effects, which reconciles previous contradictory findings.

JEL Classification: D22, J44, J63

Suggested Citation

Muehlheusser, Gerd and Schneemann, Sandra and Sliwka, Dirk, The Impact of Managerial Change on Performance: The Role of Team Heterogeneity (April 2016). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 54, Issue 2, pp. 1128-1149, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2738272 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12285

Gerd Muehlheusser (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg ( email )

Von Melle Park 5
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Sandra Schneemann

Bielefeld University ( email )

Universit├Ątsstra├če 25
Bielefeld, NRW 33613
Germany

Dirk Sliwka

University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management ( email )

Koln, 50923
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
1
Abstract Views
179
PlumX Metrics