The Dynamics of Leniency Application and Cartel Enforcement Spillovers

44 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2016 Last revised: 22 Nov 2016

See all articles by Jun Zhou

Jun Zhou

Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Date Written: February 28, 2016

Abstract

We study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels that were prosecuted by the European Commission (EC) between 1996 and 2014. The start of an EC investigation does not affect the rate at which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market also engaged in collusion. Our results shed light on enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of conspiracy.

Keywords: Leniency, Cartels, Collusion, Multi-Market Contact, Enforcement Spillovers

JEL Classification: D43, D84, K21, K42, L41

Suggested Citation

Zhou, Jun, The Dynamics of Leniency Application and Cartel Enforcement Spillovers (February 28, 2016). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2016-006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739514 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2739514

Jun Zhou (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University ( email )

Ramat Gan
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
401
Abstract Views
1,131
Rank
111,810
PlumX Metrics