Play Hard, Shirk Hard? The Effect of Bar Hours Regulation on Worker Absence

17 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2016

See all articles by Colin P. Green

Colin P. Green

Department of Economics

Maria Navarro Paniagua

Lancaster University - Management School

Date Written: April 2016

Abstract

The regulation of alcohol availability has the potential to influence worker productivity. This paper uses legislative changes in bar opening hours to provide a potential quasi‐natural experiment of the effect of alcohol availability on working effort, focusing on worker absenteeism. We examine two recent policy changes, one in England/Wales and one in Spain that increased and decreased opening hours respectively. We demonstrate a robust positive causal link between opening hours and absenteeism, although short‐lived for Spain. The effect is long lasting for the UK where we provide evidence which suggests that increased alcohol consumption is a key mechanism.

Suggested Citation

Green, Colin P. and Navarro Paniagua, Maria, Play Hard, Shirk Hard? The Effect of Bar Hours Regulation on Worker Absence (April 2016). Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 78, Issue 2, pp. 248-264, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2741408 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/obes.12106

Colin P. Green (Contact Author)

Department of Economics ( email )

Høgskoleringen
Trondheim NO-7491, 7491
Norway

Maria Navarro Paniagua

Lancaster University - Management School ( email )

Bailrigg
Lancaster, LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

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