Measuring and Changing Control: Women's Empowerment and Targeted Transfers

55 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2016

See all articles by Ingvild Almås

Ingvild Almås

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES)

Alex Armand

University of Navarra

Orazio Attanasio

Dept of Economics Yale University; Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS); University College London - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Pedro Manuel Carneiro

University College London - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Abstract

This paper studies how targeted cash transfers to women affect their empowerment. We use a novel identification strategy to measure women's willingness to pay to receive cash transfers instead of their partner receiving it. We apply this among women living in poor households in urban Macedonia. We match experimental data with a unique policy intervention (CCT) in Macedonia offering poor households cash transfers conditional on having their children attending secondary school. The program randomized whether the transfer was offered to household heads or mothers at municipality level, providing us with an exogenous source of variation in (offered) transfers. We show that women who were offered the transfer reveal a lower willingness to pay, and we show that this is in line with theoretical predictions.

Keywords: gender, empowerment, cash transfers, intra-household

JEL Classification: D13, O12, J16

Suggested Citation

Almås, Ingvild and Armand, Alex and Attanasio, Orazio and Carneiro, Pedro Manuel, Measuring and Changing Control: Women's Empowerment and Targeted Transfers. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9779, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2742567 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2742567

Ingvild Almås (Contact Author)

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES) ( email )

Stockholm, SE-10691
Sweden

Alex Armand

University of Navarra ( email )

Camino del Cerro del Aguila, 3
Pamplona, Navarra 31080
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://alexarmand.org

Orazio Attanasio

Dept of Economics Yale University ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

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London, WC1E 7AE
United Kingdom

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

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United Kingdom
+44 20 7679 5880 (Phone)
+44 20 7916 2775 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Pedro Manuel Carneiro

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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