Bribes, Crimes and Law Enforcement

Abstract

The law enforcement shortcomings in corruption cases are substantial and call for a greater scope of enforcement tools and efficient procedures. Main concerns in reform should include basic criminal law principles, consequences for markets, access to the information necessary for reactions, and value for money in enforcement operations. In this article, we suggest European governments can strengthen the preventive effects of criminal law vis-à-vis corporations by clarifying how various forms of negligence will lead to reactions, request self-assessments of estimated/accepted business risk, apply predictable principles for duty-based sanctions (with strict residual liability), and develop principled rules for negotiated settlements. In addition, for criminal law reactions to incentivize firms to self-police and self-report, we argue that debarment from public contracting and other severe consequences of a criminal-law reaction are placed under the control of criminal justice systems. Eventually, due to strict conditions on the use of criminal law reactions, it is important to let civil law reactions better complement the enforcement strategies of criminal justice systems.

Keywords: corruption, criminal law, competition