Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2742961
 


 



Investor Protection and Asset Prices


Suleyman Basak


London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Georgy Chabakauri


London School of Economics and Political Science

M. Deniz Yavuz


Purdue University - Krannert School of Management

March 6, 2016


Abstract:     
There is substantial empirical evidence that investor protection affects stock returns, volatilities and interest rates. We develop a dynamic asset pricing model to shed light on the empirical regularities and underlying mechanisms at play. Our model features a controlling shareholder who can divert a fraction of the firm's output. The controlling shareholder's power over the firm is endogenous and interacts with investor protection in determining the level of expropriation. In equilibrium, imperfect investor protection implies higher stock holdings by controlling shareholders, lower stock returns, higher stock return volatilities and lower interest rates.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: investor protection, asset pricing, controlling shareholders, expropriation, stock holdings

JEL Classification: G12, G32


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: March 7, 2016  

Suggested Citation

Basak, Suleyman and Chabakauri, Georgy and Yavuz, M. Deniz, Investor Protection and Asset Prices (March 6, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2742961 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2742961

Contact Information

Suleyman Basak
London Business School ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
44 (0)20 7000 8256 (Phone)
44 (0)20 7000 8201 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.suleymanbasak.com

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Georgy Chabakauri (Contact Author)
London School of Economics and Political Science ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/CHABAKAU/

M. Deniz Yavuz
Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )
1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 583
Downloads: 139
Download Rank: 160,727