37 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2016 Last revised: 9 May 2017
Date Written: May 6, 2017
Empirical evidence suggests that investor protection affects asset prices. We develop a dynamic asset pricing model to shed light on the empirical regularities and underlying mechanisms at play. Our model features a controlling shareholder who can divert a fraction of the firm's output. The controlling shareholder's power over the firm is endogenous and interacts with investor protection in determining the level of expropriation. In equilibrium, imperfect investor protection implies higher stock holdings by controlling shareholders, lower stock returns, higher stock return volatilities and lower interest rates.
Keywords: investor protection, asset pricing, controlling shareholders, expropriation, stock holdings
JEL Classification: G12, G32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Basak, Suleyman and Chabakauri, Georgy and Yavuz, M. Deniz, Investor Protection and Asset Prices (May 6, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2742961 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2742961