Does Regulatory Bank Oversight Impact Economic Activity? A Local Projections Approach
37 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2016 Last revised: 8 Mar 2016
Date Written: January 19, 2016
Existing research generally finds that the magnitude of the effect of supervisory rating shocks on real economic activity is small and short-lived. This is puzzling because corrective actions addressing weaknesses in underwriting and other practices frequently include lending restrictions and thus would be expected to have a stronger effect on real activity. As supervisory actions curb poorly underwritten or uneconomic loans, transmission of macroprudential policy throughout the macroeconomy should be evident in the dynamic responses of the real GDP and other measures of real activity. We use the local projections approach to estimate impulse responses from a vector autoregression (VAR) model. We show that the effect of supervisory stringency shocks is larger than the one estimated with the standard Cholesky structural VAR approach. We find that the effects are asymmetric: bank downgrades lead to a pronounced decline in real activity, while upgrades do not result in its increase. This would follow if the decrease is driven by poor lending practices that would not be expected to resume when the bank is upgraded. The linear framework averages out these effects, overstating the impact of upgrades, and understating that of downgrades. Furthermore, we document the presence of nonlinear effects for the downgrade shocks, as their impact increases disproportionately with its size. Such effects are not observed for upgrade shocks. Finally, we demonstrate that our results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls and additional endogenous variables.
Keywords: CAMELS ratings; vector autoregression; local projections; asymmetries; macroprudential policy; real activity
JEL Classification: G21; E32; E37
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation