The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in the EU and Canada

Les ateliers de l’éthique / The Ethics Forum, Volume 10, Number 2, Summer 2015, p. 89-106

PluriCourts Research Paper No. 16-06

19 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2016 Last revised: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Andreas Follesdal

Andreas Follesdal

Pluricourts

Victor M. Muniz-Fraticelli

McGill University, Faculty of Law; McGill University, Department of Political Science

Date Written: December 13, 2015

Abstract

A Principle of Subsidiarity regulates the allocation and/or use of authority within a political order where authority is dispersed between a centre and various sub-units. Section 1 sketches the role of such principle of subsidiarity in the EU, and some of its significance in Canada. Section 2 presents some conceptions of subsidiarity that indicate the range of alternatives. Section 3 considers some areas where such conceptions might add value to constitutional and political deliberations in Canada. Section 4 concludes with some reminders of crucial contested issues not fully resolved by appeals to subsidiarity alone, exemplified by the protection of human rights.

Keywords: subsidiarity, authority, european union, canada, human rights

Suggested Citation

Follesdal, Andreas and Muniz-Fraticelli, Victor M., The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in the EU and Canada (December 13, 2015). Les ateliers de l’éthique / The Ethics Forum, Volume 10, Number 2, Summer 2015, p. 89-106; PluriCourts Research Paper No. 16-06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2743751

Andreas Follesdal

Pluricourts ( email )

P.O. Box 6706
St. Olavs plass 5
0130 Oslo
Norway

Victor M. Muniz-Fraticelli (Contact Author)

McGill University, Faculty of Law

3644 Peel Street
Montreal, Quebec H3A 1W9
Canada

McGill University, Department of Political Science ( email )

Room 414, Leacock Building
855 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7
Canada

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